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Hence the status of a land owner cannot per se affect the operation of
a by-law implementing the statutory power without defeating the statu-
tory power itself.4 3
Has the present Supreme Court reversed itself and defeated the
statutory powers of zoning?
The provincial legislature has imposed an important limitation upon the
power of the council in requiring that by-laws such as these must be
approved by this Board before they become effective, and on application
for such approval the Board should be satisfied after due inquiry into
the circumstances that council has in good faith decided to enact the
by-law or amend to protect or promote public interest, after considering




Lepine v. University Hospital Board & Monckton [1966] S.C.R. 561.
NEGLIGENCE - EPILEPTIC PATIENT SUFFERING FROM POST-EPILEPTIC
AUTOMATISM - LEAP FROM WARD WINDOW OF DEFENDENT HOSPITAL
- REASONABLY FORESEEABLE WHERE BOTH DEFENDANTS KNEW OF
PLAINTIFF'S VIOLENT AND UNCONTROLLED MENTAL ILLNESS.
In a recent decision the Supreme Court of Canada shortly disposed
of a question, the merits of which, it is respectfully submitted,
demanded a far more intensive examination than the court was pre-
pared to give it. The problem which arose in the case of Lepine v.
University Hospital Board & Monckton' is one of the degree of care
to which a patient, suffering from a specific known ailment, is entitled
to receive from a hospital which accepts the responsibility of his
treatment. The plaintiff suffered from epilepsy, and in the seven days
previous to the unfortunate accident had had a series of seizures,
initially in his hotel room, where he resided while receiving treatment
from defendant doctor, and then in the defendant hospital where he
was taken by the police after becoming violent and mentally dis-
oriented. Those seizures known of in the hospital were carefully
documented by the nursing staff, as well as his previous epileptic
history before entering hospital. More importantly, the staff of the
hospital was well aware of his desire, while mentally uncontrolled,
to escape the confines of his room on the fourth floor and the hospital
43 Canadian Petrofina Ltd., supra, footnote 15; see also Spiers v. Toum-
ship Toronto, 1950] O.W.N. 427, at 431, where Ferguson, J. adopts the
reasoning of Viscount Cave and states: "That judgment [Separate Schools
case] makes it clear that the status of the building owner is not the test."
44 Is Zoning Wagging the Dog, supra, footnote 1.
George Elliott, B.A. (McGill), is a member of the 1967 graduating class
at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [1966] S.C.R. 561, (1965) 54 D.L.R. (2d) 340 (Alta. C.A.), (1965) 50
D.L.R (2d) 225 (Alta Sup. Ct.).
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entirely, since he had twice, within the span of several hours, run out
onto the city streets; he was on both occasions found and returned
only with the aid of the police. After he was taken back to his room
on the fourth floor, and in the presence of several police constables,
a hospital orderly, a nurse, and the defendant doctor who had just
entered the room, the plaintiff jumped up on a chair and dove out
the window, sustaining severe, but not fatal, injuries. Plaintiff sub-
sequently brought separate actions against the hospital and the doctor
based on the alleged negligence of the respective defendants, and
these by agreement were tried together in this present action.
Clearly, it was known by the defendants that the plaintiff suffered
from a form of epilepsy known as "Automatism", and was among a
small number, perhaps no more than twenty per cent, who move about
during a seizure, sometimes at considerable danger to themselves
or others.2 Moreover, the acting-out by the plaintiff while in this
"automaton" condition, and the violent incoherence which he dis-
played as a result, were not only observed by those coming into contact
with him, but were recorded in his file, and both defendants had
access to these records. At trial, Farthing J. said:
... the defendant from the start had definite knowledge of his tendency
to dangerous post-epileptic automatism...3
After a lengthy review of both the evidence and the relevant
authorities from Canada, England, and the United States, Farthing
J. held that negligence against the defendant hospital had been shown
clearly, but dismissed plaintiff's action against Dr. Monckton. As to
the negligence of the hospital, Farthing J. said:
In the instant case, his tendency to irresponsible moving about was well
known to all concerned. 4
In my ... opinion .. the misfortune which befell the plaintiff resulted
from the fact that . .. [the defendant] . . . placed him in the category
of an ordinary epileptic.5
The defendant undertook the care of the plaintiff who . suffered
shattering injuries while in such care . . . In the light of the evidence
... plaintiff is entitled to judgment.6
As for the action against Dr. Monckton, the court held that while
the doctor agreed with the hospital policy, no culpable negligence was
attributable to him.
It seems to me clear that the only real ground of complaint against him
was his failure - if any - to protect the hospital authorities against the
policy by which his patient, afflicted with post-epileptic automatism of a
type manifestly dangerous to himself, and perhaps to others, was subject
to the same rules as to quarters and care as those suffering merely
from non-automatic epilepsy.7








Farthing J. concluded that Dr. Monckton was guilty, at most, of
an error of judgment, but not one amounting to negligence.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Alberta, the court unan-
imously dismissed the hospital's appeal, and by a majority of two to
one allowed plaintiff's appeal against the defendant doctor. As to the
negligence of the defendant hospital, Smith J.A. said:
• . . there was ample evidence upon which the learned trial Judge ...
could find that the allegations of negligence against the hospital were
established... [and] . . . that the lack of supervision was the effective
cause of the accident to the respondent.8
Cairns J.A. more fully stated his findings by looking to the plaintiff's
illness and came to the conclusion,
that not only had the condition of Lepine worsened, but he became.
psychotic... This condition was known by Nurse Collins and was known
to Dr. Shea ... The negligence which caused the plaintiff's damage was
continuous . . . and is not confined to the incident when he jumped out
the window. It should have been foreseen or anticipated that a patient
in his changed condition might well do damage to himself.9
As to Dr. Monckton, Cairns J.A. in effect upheld Farthing J.'s view of
the matter and dismissed Lepine's appeal because,
The doctor knew nothing of the changed condition of Lepine until he
went into the room on the 24th when the accident occurred . .. [EIe
cannot be responsible for not knowing of the situation as it stood at
that time, that is to say the changed condition of Lepine. He did not
have any opportunity to take any steps to obviate the danger.10
The third member of the court, Johnson J.A. found negligence on the
part of the hospital for their failure to supply constant supervision to
the patient who was in extreme mental upset. As to liability attaching
to Dr. Monckton, he found that,
Dr. Monckton admitted that he had been given all the information that
Dr. Shea and the hospital nurses had . . . He was the one most fully
aware of the danger. He requested that Lepine be treated in that ward.
The responsibility for seeing that extra care be provided was, at its very
least, a shared responsibility. Therefore, . . . Dr. Monckton and the
hospital should be held liable."1
Notwithstanding the disagreement over the merit of the plain-
tiff's claim as to the negligence of the defendant doctor, all four
Judges in both courts found that, as a fact, the defendants were clearly
aware of the plaintiff's condition, not just as an epileptic, but as one
who suffered from the far more volatile condition of "automatism".
It was because of this knowledge accruing to the defendants that
the courts held it was negligent for both the defendants not to have
provided the standard of care which would have prevented the plaintiff
from suffering his damages, had it been provided.
On the appeal by both defendants to the Supreme Court of Canada,
both appeals were allowed. The court, it is respectfully submitted,
erroneously minimized the effect of the lower court's findings. Hall
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J., after a rather detailed review of judgments of the lower courts,
said:
apart from the somewhat general finding that Lepine should have
had but was not given continuous supervision on a round the clock basis
from July 17 onwards, there does not appear to be a consensus on the
part of the Judges below other than if such supervision had been
provided Lepine would not have ... jumped from the window.12
To arrive at the consensus apparently demanded by the Supreme
Court, all four Judges, who had attached liability to the defendants,
would have had to agree, somewhat unrealistically, to the type of
supervision required, the number of participants, and the length of
time they were to remain at the plaintiff's bedside. While this may be
hair-splitting, it does seem clear that a definite finding of negligence
was made, and if the cure suggested varies, it is not of primary im-
portance.
Several criticisms may be made as to the manner in which Hall
J. denied the plaintiff's remedy. Hall J. employed a two stage argu-
ment; in the first stage, he divorces the events preceding the jump
from the jump itself:
* . . all Judges below.., seemed unable to visualize the situation as it
developed towards its climax without being able to test the steps in
the tragic occurrence except in the light of the final act of jumping.13
This statement in itself seems rather a hasty claim in the light of
what Cairns J. said in the Court of Appeal:
[T]he negligence which caused the plaintiff's damage was continuous
and is not confined to the incident when he jumped out the window.1 4
Notwithstanding this inconsistency, Hall J. continued on in the
second stage where he said that the true test of liability lay in regard
to the "tragic" events leading up to the jump. The test,
. . . [as to] . . . [tlhe question of whether there was or was not
negligence . .. [o]ne principle emerges upon which there is universal
agreement, namely, that whether or not an act or omission is negligent
must be judged not by its consequences alone but also by considering
whether a reasonable person should have anticipated that what happened
might be a natural result of that act or omission.1 5
Hall J. then concluded that on this test, proposed in the case of
Glasgow Corporation v. Muir,16 Lepine's sudden leap through the
window was not an event which a reasonable man would have fore-
seen and which would have required the defendants to take more
precautions than were taken.
... the injuries sustained by Lepine were the result of an impulse on
his part which could not reasonably have been foreseen.17
It is unclear whether Hall J., by stating the "universal" principle,
was inferring that the courts failed to apply the proper method to
12 [19661 S.C.R. 561, 578.
13 Ibid. 579.
14 (1965) 54 D.L.R. (2d) 340, 356, per Cairns J.A.
15 [1966] S.C.R. 561, 579.
16 [19431 A.C. 449.
17 [1966] S.C.R. 580.
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deducing tort liability, or whether he merely stated the rule, and
substituted his own conclusion for the one arrived at by the lower
courts. Assuming that the Glasgow Corporation principle is based
upon a determination of "foresight", it would clearly appear that
both the trial judge and the Justices of Appeal employed the "fore-
sight" test, after finding that the defendants did have knowledge of
plaintiff's specific illness, and had seen an acting-out, in a violent
form, of this illness. Had they not, of course, had notice of his mental
unpredictability, then it would not be reasonable to assume they
should have "foreseen" his jump or damage of a similar type. But
the defendants did have actual knowledge of plaintiff's problem. Farth-
ing J. in the trial clearly found this.18
In the Court of Appeal, Cairns J. spoke of a Nurse Collins who
was concerned with the plaintiff's condition,
... because on the chart which she made out on leaving she noted the
words 'psychiatric assistance?' This certainly was a warning to the
medical staff.. 19
Clearly then, where the court accepts the fact that the defendants are
in possession of certain facts and ultimately finds negligence, they are
impliedly finding that, on these facts, the defendants as reasonable
men should have foreseen the events which caused the plaintiff to
sustain his injury. Hall J., and his brothers in the Supreme Court,
20
employing the same test of liability, on the same reported facts, came
to the exact opposite conclusion.
This conclusion of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is respectfully
submitted, is erroneous. The decision is arguable in respect of two
aspects: the first, shortly, being one of the advisability of an appellate
court using the same principle of law in regard to the same facts and
reversing the effect of these facts. The Court of Appeal in the present
case unanimously held that the trial Judge had carefully weighed the
evidence and come to the correct decision on his view of the facts.
Smith J. in concluding his judgment said that to him,
it would be unjustifiably interfering with the function of the trial Judge
to weigh the evidence and come to the opposite conclusion in so far
as the hospital is concerned ... [and] ... this case is one in which not
to have seen the witnesses puts appellate Judges in a permanent position
of disadvantage against the trial Judges... [where] ... it has not been
shown that he has failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage...
by failing to observe inconsistencies or indisputable fact or material
probabilities. 21
And further Cairns J. A. stated:
... and I do not conceive it to be the function of this court to question his
findings where they were based on ample evidence 22
As to the second aspect, it does not seem as difficult as the Supreme
Court made it appear for the reasonable man to visualize the plaintiff,
18 (1965) 50 D.L.R. (2d) 225, 245-6.
19 (1965) 54 D.L.R. (2d) 340,348, per Cairns J.A.
20 Abbot, Martland, Judson, Ritchie and Hall J.J.
21 (1965), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 340, 341-2, per Smith J.A.
22 Ibid. 343.
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mentally disoriented as he was, choosing the window as a means of
escape when he saw the door was blocked by the police and some
hospital staff. The defendants were, as was noted above, aware of
both the plaintiff's tendencies to move about uncontrollably, and the
seriousness of his illness. Therefore, it is submitted, that because of
the violent consequences of his disease, and more importantly because
his disease was of a mental nature, the defendants should have at-
tached to them a higher standard of care, the 'breaching of which
should have led to a finding of negligence by the Supreme Court.
In the case of Stradel v. Albertson et al,23 the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal found that there was no liability on the part of a hospital
for the suicide of a patient where none of the deceased's symptoms,
known to his doctor or to the hospital, suggested suicidal tendencies.
Gordon J.A. found that a reasonable man would not have anticipated
the suicidal leap.24 Unlike the Stradel decision, however, Lepine was
known to have "epileptic automatism" and his mental aberrations
were well known to the hospital, leading therefore, to the conclusion
that, had the same degree of knowledge been available in the Strade
case, liability might clearly have attached. Furthermore, Lepine
should not have been treated as a normal patient undergoing treat-
ment, not even a normal epileptic patient, but as one whose mental
condition rendered him liable to pursue any course of conduct, and
therefore the plaintiff's leap should have been, if not anticipated, at
least contemplated.
In Cahoon v. Edmonton Hospital Board,25 although the plaintiff,
who was burned by falling against an unenclosed radiator near his
bed, was denied his remedy because the occurrence was found to be
an accident rather than negligence on the part of the hospital, the trial
Judge clearly expressed the view (although obiter) that mental disease
or epilepsy does require some difference in standards:
The medical superintendent of the defendant hospital said that there
would be no indication to use side boards where the patient was under
treatment for a chipped patella and where there was no history or
evidence of mental illness. 26
And further,
It is clear from the evidence . . . that the plaintiff was not suffering
from any mental disease or disturbance prior to being admitted to the
defendants' hospital ... there were no symptoms of any kind exhibited
by the plaintiff to lead . . . [his doctor] . . . to believe that special
precautions were needed. There was no history of epitepsy.27
Earlier decisions, it seems, have distinguished the situation where
a hospital is faced with the admission of a person suffering from some
sort of malady which may cause him to lose control of his actions
from the ordinary situation, and the hospital is then put, not unreason-
23 [1954] 2 D.L.R. 328 (Sask. C.A.).
24 Ibid. 335.





ably, on notice that the patient may not remain docile in his sick bed.
Where there is this risk the hospital must clearly adjust its standards
to meet additional extra-normal contingencies which may arise. In
the Lepine situation, while it may be completely out of the question
for a normal patient to dive out of a fourth storey window, it ought to
be reasonably foreseeable that a man, without the normal mental
control, who has attempted violent escapes previously, might conceive
of jumping through a window, especially if other escape routes were
cut off.
Further, it is arguable that liability may still be attached to the
defendants notwithstanding the lack of a specific duty and breach,
which leads to a finding of negligence, where, in general, the activity
pursued by the defendant, albeit approved by custom, is not sufficient
to provide the patient with the required standards of treatment. The
proposition that procedures in accordance with general and approved
conduct justifies activity which may otherwise be negligent has been
upheld in several Canadian cases, so that a hospital imitating routines
present in other hospitals may escape liability. It is submitted that,
in the interest of the public at large, this justification of approved
customary conduct is in specific cases untenable.
The leading case is Vancouver General Hospital v. McDaniel et
a128 where it was held that a defendant charged with negligence will
not be liable if he has acted in accordance with general and approved
practice. Here a diptheria patient contracted smallpox when he was
placed on the same floor of a hospital with patients having smallpox.
In the Privy Council Lord Alness said:
... these medical men . . . affirm that the technique . . is in accord
with general if not with universal practice today in Canada and the
United States ... A defendant charged with negligence can clear his...
if he shows that he has acted in accord with general and approved
practice. 29
The doctrine was again followed in the case of Robinson v. Annapolis
General Hospital & Kerr3O where the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held
that no negligence was attributable to the defendant hospital for a lack
of supervision by its nurses where the plaintiff fell from her bed. The
nurses, it was found, were justified in believing that the supervision
given was satisfactory, and that the practice, in fact followed, was
standard approved practice.
This proposition of the invincibility of following the generally
approved practice was further reinforced in the recent Ontario deci-
sion of Murphy v. St. Catharine's General Hospital et al.31 In this case
Gale C.J. found negligence where a piece of intravenous tubing became
lodged in the plaintiff's arm because of the actions of an incompetent
intern. Gale C.J. inter alia held:
28 [19341 4 D.L.R. 593 (P.C.).
29 Ibid. 596.
30 (1956) 4 D.L.R. (2d) 421.
31 (1964) 41 D.L.R. (2d) 697 (Ont. H.C.).
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. . . the hospital was clearly negligent, failing... to match the standard
of care that ought to be maintained by any hospital of its size and Im-
portance.3
2
He continued on to compare the methodology of the operation in
question with several large Toronto hospitals, implying that negligence
would not have attached to the defendant hospital had their routine
been the same as Toronto General Hospital, among others.
In the present case, notwithstanding that all elements may have
represented the general routines of hospitals in regard to the treat-
ment of epileptics, the court, it is respectfully submitted, could and
should have struck down the practice of the hospital in treating as
one class all epileptic sufferers, as it restricted the hospital from dis-
charging its general obligation to sufficiently treat each patient in-
dividually. Farthing J., besides finding a definite breach of the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff, also took cognizance of the "custom-
ary practice" proposition and found that if those in charge of hospitals
can escape liability for negligence,
simply on the plea that they have complied with the established practice,
they can, in effect, in the course of time create enough customs to provide
a good defence against almost any claim for damages for personal
injuries.3
3
Where a customary practice denies a plaintiff his remedy, as in the
present case, the court should express its disapproval of this unjust
practice, and find the defendants negligent on a basis of a "protective"
public policy.
Special circumstances may require the adoption of extraordinary
precautions such that a common practice itself may be condemned as
negligent-if pregnant with obvious risks.
34





33 (1965) 50 D.L.R. (2d) 225, 272-3.
34 FL wiNG, JoHN G., TAm LAw OF TORTS, 3rd ed., (Sydney: Law Book Co.
of Australia Pty. Ltd., 1965) 122, 123.
35 Bank of MontreaZ v. Dominion Guarantee Co., [1930] A.C. 659, 666, per
Lord Tomlin.
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